scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies in the period leading up to the passage of the Act.
The PCAOB's unique design as a private-sector corporation with vast regulatory powers sparked controversy from the start. Notwithstanding Sarbanes-Oxley's explicit provision that "[t]he Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government," my first article on the 5 PCAOB contended that the Board is part of the federal government, at least for purposes of the Constitution. In the course of the Free Enterprise Fund 6 litigation, the PCAOB and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") as intervenor have conceded that the PCAOB is subject to constitutional scrutiny. 7 Accordingly, the controversy now centers on whether the PCAOB's structure complies with the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. That structure has been called into question because the five members who head the PCAOB are neither appointed nor removable by the President. Instead, PCAOB members are appointed for fixed, five-year terms by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or "Commission"), an independent regulatory agency that is itself insulated from direct presidential control. Moreover, PCAOB members are removable only by the SEC and only for willful or unjustifiable transgressions. On behalf of a group of corporate and securities law scholars, I filed an amici curiae brief supporting the Petitioners' position that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional. The brief 8 made clear that while we applauded Congress's decision to establish a new regulator to oversee the auditors of public companies, we were concerned that the particular design accorded the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability. 9 No matter how the Supreme Court rules on the constitutional issues, its decision in Free Enterprise Fund is bound to have far-reaching implications for the future of securities enforcement and financial regulation in general. If the PCAOB's structure is upheld by the Court, we can expect Congress to create many more independent regulators answerable in only limited respects to the SEC or other independent regulatory agencies. Congress has already been urged to create PCAOB-like entities to oversee credit rating agencies 10 and the mutual fund industry. The possibility of additional regulators 11 modeled on the PCAOB is worrisome because the PCAOB's structure renders it less accountable to the public than traditional independent regulatory agencies (whose members are appointed by the President with advice and consent from the Senate, and are removable for cause by the President). Moreover, regulators designated as "private" can operate with substantially less transparency because statutes such as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Government in Sunshine Act generally apply only to federal agencies.
Significant consequences will also flow from a Court ruling that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional. Although Congress likely would act quickly to restructure the PCAOB, either as a regulator with presidentially appointed board members who are removable for-cause by the President or as a unit within the SEC with members who are SEC employees, the legislative process could open the door to additional changes. A ruling that the PCAOB 12 is unconstitutional may also subject the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to new constitutional scrutiny, since both the MSRB and the SIPC share the PCAOB's status as a congressionally created regulator in the private sector. A broad holding by the Court could raise questions about the level of independence asserted by even long-standing federal agencies such as the In addition, no matter what constitutional verdict is ultimately rendered for the PCAOB, the Court's decision may affect the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in the securities industry, such as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) (formerly, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)). Indeed, because Congress modeled the SEC's oversight of the PCAOB on the statutory provisions applicable to the NYSE and NASD, the Court is likely to examine closely the relationship between those SROs and the SEC in the course of its analysis of the PCAOB.
Securities law scholars are generally reluctant to delve into debates about constitutional and administrative law. Yet Free Enterprise Fund raises a threshold issue that calls out for securities law expertise. As this Article will show, the D.C. Circuit's 2-1 decision upholding the constitutionality of the PCAOB was predicated on the majority's determination that the PCAOB 14 was a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC, with the Board's exercise 15 of its statutory duties "subject to check by the Commission at every significant step." If the D.C. Circuit's depiction of the PCAOB is incorrect, as this 16 Article contends, then the arguments supporting the PCAOB's constitutionality fall with it. PCAOB members acting with significant discretion and autonomy outside of the SEC's control would be "principal officers" who, pursuant to the Appointments Clause, must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. And as "principal officers" performing significant executive functions, PCAOB members must be removable for cause by the President. Securities scholars thus have much to contribute to the constitutional analysis of the PCAOB. The essential role for securities scholars in the debate over the PCAOB's constitutionality became even clearer during the oral argument before the Supreme Court. At the outset of the Government's argument, Solicitor General Elena Kagan emphasized that "resolution of this case" turns on a "simple syllogism." Her major premise was that the "President has 18 constitutionally sufficient control over the SEC" and her minor premise was that " [t] he SEC has comprehensive control over the Accounting Board." Her 19 conclusion was that "the President has constitutionally sufficient control over the Accounting Board." I completely agree that the constitutionality of the 20 PCAOB turns on the validity of this syllogism. This Article, however, seeks to show that the syllogism's minor premise is grounded in an inaccurate view of the PCAOB-SEC relationship.
The analysis in this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents a snapshot of the PCAOB and examines the D.C. Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions. Part II challenges the panel majority's characterization of the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC and explains why the PCAOB must instead be regarded as an independent regulatory entity in its own right. In so doing, Part II examines Sarbanes-Oxley's text, its legislative history, the SRO model on which the PCAOB was patterned, and insights derived from the constitutional doctrine of nondelegation. Building on the view that PCAOB members exercise significant discretion and autonomy notwithstanding the SEC's oversight and enforcement authority, Part III then analyzes the PCAOB under the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. It concludes that the PCAOB's structure violates the Constitution in both respects. Part III also explains why neither the regulated nor protected public is well served by a congressionally created "private" regulator such as the PCAOB with double-decker independence. 21 . 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006 In establishing the PCAOB "to oversee the audit of public companies,"
21
Congress recognized that it was creating a "strange kind of entity." As
22
Senator Phil Gramm explained: "We want it to be private, but we want it to have governmental powers. We have tried to structure it in ways to try to accommodate this."
23
There is no dispute that Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted in the wake of the massive accounting and corporate governance scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other public companies, vested the PCAOB with broad governmental powers and responsibilities. These powers and responsibilities encompass substantial enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative functions, and include 24 the authority to register accounting firms that audit public companies; enact 25 rules setting standards for auditing, quality control, ethics, and independence; inspect on a yearly basis the nation's largest accounting firms 26 and inspect other firms at least once every three years; investigate 27 accounting firms and their associated persons for possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal securities laws; and impose discipline for 28 established violations through a range of sanctions including censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and substantial monetary fines.
29
Willful violations of PCAOB rules may be prosecuted by the DOJ as federal crimes. In addition, the Act authorizes the PCAOB to set its own budget, and to fund that budget through the imposition of an "accounting support fee" levied on public companies.
31
The statutory text also evidences Congress's clear intention to vest the PCAOB's broad regulatory powers in a private, nonprofit corporation. In a subsection captioned "status," Congress provided that:
The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall be subject to, and have all the powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by, the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act. No member or person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such service.
32
The PCAOB is headed by five members appointed by the SEC for fixed fiveyear terms "after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury," with vacancies filled "in the same manner." PCAOB members can be removed the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining whether a corporation would be deemed a part of the federal government for purposes of constitutional law, notwithstanding statutory text to the contrary. The Lebron case involved a First Amendment challenge to actions by Amtrak, which, like the PCAOB, was established by an Act of Congress providing that the corporation "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government." Justice Scalia, writing for himself and seven other Justices, 38 held explicitly that "it is not for Congress to make the final determination of [a corporation's] status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions. at http:/www.realcoporatelawyer.com/wsl/wsl0304.html (stating that the PCAOB intended to recognize good-faith assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination, but observing that as "a non-governmental entity, the Board has a strong argument that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to its processes, and thus could require registered public accounting firms or their associated persons to testify or produce documents").
42. (1) "the Government creates a corporation by special law," (2) "for the furtherance of governmental objectives," and (3) "retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation," that entity "is part of the Government for purposes of [the Constitution]."
40
Although PCAOB officials initially intimated that its status as a private corporation allowed it to operate free from the constraints of the Constitution, the PCAOB's congressional creation as a regulatory entity with 41 an SEC-appointed board ultimately left the PCAOB and DOJ with no choice but to concede that, under the holding in Lebron, the PCAOB is "part of the Government" and its members are federal officers for purposes of constitutional law.
42
Congress's design of the PCAOB as a "strange kind of entity" thus presents the Supreme Court with a statutory conundrum: The Court must determine whether PCAOB members are "principal officers" or "inferior officers" in the face of a congressional statute providing that PCAOB members are not federal officers. This conundrum requires the Court itself to situate the PCAOB within an organizational chart of the federal government. Only then can the Justices determine whether the Appointments Clause permits PCAOB members to be appointed by the SEC, and whether the statutory limitations on the appointment and removal of PCAOB members are consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.
B. The Decision by the D.C. Circuit
When the D.C. Circuit attempted to place the PCAOB within an organizational chart of the federal government, the members of its three-judge panel constructed diametrically different versions. Judge Judith Rogers, in 43 a majority opinion joined by Judge Janice Brown, depicted the PCAOB as a "specialized" and "heavily controlled component" of the SEC, with the 44 Board's exercise of its statutory duties "subject to check by the Commission Board rule is promulgated and no Board sanction is imposed without the Commission's stamp of approval." The majority further emphasized that the 50 SEC must approve the PCAOB's annual budget as well as the formula for the "accounting support fee" that Congress authorized the PCAOB to levy on public companies to fund its budget. The majority also called attention to the 51 SEC's broad enforcement authority over the PCAOB, and highlighted the specific provisions in the Act that, in the majority's words, authorize the SEC "to limit and remove Board authority altogether." These broad enforcement 52 provisions, according to the majority, essentially grant the SEC "at-will removal power over Board functions if not Board members [.] " In addition, 53 the majority highlighted Sarbanes-Oxley's provision empowering the SEC to "promulgate such rules and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of investors, in furtherance of this Act."
54
The majority's view of the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC was essential to its ultimate conclusion that the PCAOB's structure violates neither the Appointments Clause nor the doctrine of separation of powers. With respect to the Appointments Clause, the majority held that "in view of the Commission's comprehensive control of the Board, Board members are subject to direction and supervision of the Commission and thus 55 Judge Kavanaugh's view that the PCAOB constitutes an "independent agency," notwithstanding the SEC's oversight and enforcement authority over the Board, was likewise essential to his conclusion that the PCAOB's structure violates both the Appointments Clause and principles of separation of power. In his view, PCAOB members are not "inferior officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause because they "are not 'directed and supervised' by the SEC." Here, Judge Kavanaugh emphasized that the SEC 57 lacks at-will removal authority over Board members, "the SEC does not have statutory authority to remove them for failure to follow substantive SEC direction or supervision; and the SEC does not have statutory authority to prevent and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, Board inspections, Board investigations, and Board enforcement actions." 58 Thus, as Judge Kavanaugh saw it, the PCAOB's five members are "principal officers" who must be appointed by the President subject to advice and consent from the Senate. He also emphasized that the PCAOB's five members are removable for cause only by the SEC, which is itself an independent agency whose members are removable only for cause by the President, and that the "President's power to remove is critical to the President's power to control the Executive Branch and perform his Article II responsibilities." 59 Accordingly, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that the PCAOB's structure violates separation of powers because the President's "two levels of for-cause removal away from Board members . . . effectively eliminates any Presidential power to control the PCAOB, notwithstanding that the Board performs 60 As the above snapshot reveals, the three members of the D.C. Circuit panel differed not so much in their view of the Constitution as in their view of the structural relationship between the SEC and the PCAOB. The majority went so far as to observe that if "the Board is itself an independent agency . . . the dissent's conclusion that the Board's structure is unconstitutional conveniently follows." 61 The analysis in this Part explains why the panel majority's depiction of the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC is inaccurate. Section A examines Sarbanes-Oxley's establishment of the PCAOB as a private corporation and takes issue with the view that the PCAOB is a "component" of the SEC. Section B then highlights the statutory text and legislative history evidencing Congress's intent to establish the PCAOB as a strong, independent board headed by five members who would act with substantial discretion and autonomy. Section C examines the SRO model on which the PCAOB was patterned. This model, and the SEC's own statements regarding SRO discretion and autonomy, bolsters the conclusion that Congress designed the PCAOB to be substantively independent from the SEC. The fourth and final section examines the constitutional doctrine of nondelegation and explains why this doctrine provides valuable insight into congressional decisions regarding the PCAOB's design. This examination, in turn, informs the analysis of the Appointments Clause and separation of powers issues in the final Part of this Article.
A. The PCAOB's Status as a Corporation in the Private Sector
Congress's decision to create the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation in the private sector belies the characterization of the PCAOB as a "component" of the SEC, or as a "regulatory subunit" within the SEC, as amici supporting the PCAOB have suggested. As the Supreme Court explained in Lebron, 62 Congress had a stroke of genius when it chose to organize the board as an independent not-forprofit organization rather than as a unit of the government. The board will be able to offer a compensation structure that will attract highly qualified individuals and offer them a career path although Congress's decision to situate an entity in the private sector is not determinative of its status for constitutional purposes, Congress's choice of the private sector "is assuredly dispositive of" that entity's status "for purposes of matters that are within Congress's control-for example, whether it is subject to statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government entities, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the laws governing Government procurement." Congress's decision to situate the PCAOB in the private 63 sector should also be dispositive as to whether the PCAOB is a "component" or a "regulatory subunit" of the SEC. By establishing the PCAOB as a private corporation, Congress ensured that the PCAOB would stand separate and apart from the SEC. It is that separateness that exempts the PCAOB from statutes applicable to federal "agencies," including those statutes cited by the Court in Lebron. The PCAOB's separateness from the SEC also facilitates the substantial salaries that are paid to PCAOB members and employees. In 2008, the Chairman of the PCAOB received a salary of $654,406, and the PCAOB's four other members received $531,995. Those salaries are almost four times the amount 64 received by the SEC's Chairman and Commissioners, but are comparable to those commanded in the private sector. Congress's concern about salary competiveness is clear from the Act's text, which authorizes the PCAOB to fix employee salaries "at a level comparable to private sector self-regulatory, accounting, supervisory, or other staff or management positions." Concern 65 about competitive compensation was no doubt an important factor in Congress's decision to situate the PCAOB in the private sector. Attempts to salvage the PCAOB's constitutionality by reconstructing it as a "component" or a "regulatory subunit" of the SEC are particularly inappropriate because Congress specifically considered that alternative and rejected it in favor of the structure ultimately selected for the PCAOB. In creating the PCAOB as an independent regulator in the private sector, Congress acted contrary to the advice provided by its own agent, the Comptroller General of the United States.
In the Senate hearings that preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, then-Comptroller General David Walker testified that there were "several alternative structures" from which Congress could choose in establishing a new regulator for the accounting industry, including the creation of: "(1) a new unit within the SEC; (2) an independent government entity within the SEC; (3) an independent government agency outside the SEC; or (4) a nongovernmental private-sector body overseen by the SEC." Although he 67 recognized that all four alternatives had strengths and weaknesses, the Comptroller General believed that alternatives one and four had lesser likelihoods of success. He specifically noted that "under alternatives one and four, the new body would have less direct accountability to the Congress and the public than a body with board members who are PASs [President appointed confirmed by the Senate]."
68
The legislative history further reveals that the House of Representatives had initially favored an alternative altogether different from the four suggested by the Comptroller General. Under the proposed "Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act" (CAARTA), a bill sponsored by Representative Michael Oxley, Congress would have established explicit criteria for "public regulatory organizations," but Congress itself would not have created any such entity. Rather, the bill required the SEC to 69 promulgate rules reflecting and supplementing the congressional criteria, and authorized the SEC to "recognize" entities that applied to the SEC pursuant to its rules. As such, this section of the CAARTA bore a close resemblance 73. See id. at 48 (referencing the "tangled jumble of existing industry organizations"). See also Nagy, supra note 6, at 996-98 (discussing the congressional hearings that led up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, and noting that most witnesses "shared the view that the accounting profession's system of self-regulation was in need of a serious overhaul" and that any newly-created entity "should not be dependent for funding on the accounting profession"). to provisions in the Maloney Act of 1938, which authorized the SEC to 71 "recognize" national securities associations, such as the NASD. Critics of the CAARTA contended that its framework left too much discretion with the SEC and the accounting industry itself, "effectively allowing these issues to remain open to debate even after Congress has acted." Critics also pointed to the 72 accounting industry's largely unsuccessful history of self-regulation. 73 Although CAARTA passed the House by a vote of 334 to 90, its "public 74 regulatory organization" alternative was subsequently abandoned in favor of an accounting oversight board that was congressionally created.
Congress also contemplated alternatives that would have made the SEC directly responsible for the oversight of public accounting firms. A number of witnesses, including former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, advised against the creation of a new accounting regulator, and instead urged Congress to increase the SEC's funding so that the SEC could serve as the "primary enforcer of the law." Responsive to these and other suggestions for enhanced Sarbanes-Oxley's text leaves no doubt that Congress ultimately chose the fourth alternative outlined in the Comptroller General's Senate testimony-the creation of "a nongovernmental private-sector entity overseen by the SEC." Thus, in depicting the PCAOB as a mere "component" of the SEC to salvage its constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit essentially turned back the clock and selected for Congress the Comptroller General's first alternative that Congress had rejected-"a unit within the SEC." Because the choice of a constitutional structure for the PCAOB is one that belongs to Congress, the Supreme Court should not affirm that revisionism.
B. The PCAOB's Substantial Discretion and Autonomy
The D.C. Circuit erred not only in its finding that the PCAOB was a "component" of the SEC; it was also incorrect in its assessment that SarbanesOxley's provision for SEC oversight and enforcement constitutes "extraordinary" authority, with the PCAOB's powers subject to "a vast 79 degree of Commission control at every significant step." Both the Act's text 80 and legislative history confirm Congress's deliberate intention to structure the PCAOB as an entity that would operate with a substantial degree of discretion and autonomy, free from SEC control in a number of important respects.
The Statutory Text
Several aspects of the statutory text evidence the PCAOB's substantive independence from the SEC. First and foremost are the Act's provisions for appointment and removal of the PCAOB's five members. PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC for staggered five-year terms, and are removable 81 82. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6). 83. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 680 n.9. 84. See id. at 701 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the term "'independent agency' . . . traditionally has been applied by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Executive Branch to agencies like the PCAOB whose heads are not removable at will").
85. Indeed, fixed statutory terms of service, with explicit or implicit restrictions on an official's removal, constitute the traditional hallmarks of an "independent" regulatory agency.
84
PCAOB members are insulated from removal-or threats of removal-to an extent even greater than the political insulation accorded to SEC Commissioners. SEC Commissioners, like the heads of many other independent agencies, serve for fixed five-year terms. And SEC Commissioners, like other agency heads, may be removed from office only "for cause" by the President. But "cause," for purposes of Presidential removal, is typically viewed as "inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." A contemplated removal of a PCAOB member by the SEC, in 85 contrast, triggers specific procedural protections and requires a higher showing of culpability. The Act provides that PCAOB members may be removed only if:
The Commission finds, on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that such member: (A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by an registered public accounting firm or any associated person thereof. 86 The statutory requirement for an on-the-record finding of a Board member's "willful" violation or abuse of authority, and the specific allowance for enforcement failures based on "reasonable" justifications or excuses, constitute severe limitations on the SEC's ability to influence the five Sarbanes-Oxley's provision for fixed terms and restricted removal allow PCAOB members to remain free to establish and pursue their own policy goals and priorities, particularly with respect to PCAOB investigations, enforcement actions, and rulemaking. The SEC might, for example, conclude that the PCAOB is devoting too many-or too few-of its investigatory resources to the large accounting firms; or that the PCAOB is bringing too many-or too few-enforcement actions in the area of auditor independence. Likewise, the SEC could conclude that the PCAOB's rulemaking initiatives should be focusing less-or more-on the area of internal controls. The SEC, however, cannot act on its displeasure by threatening to replace one or more of the PCAOB's five members with new members whose policy priorities would be more in line with the SEC's. Once a PCAOB member is appointed, the Act effectively provides that he or she has five years to shape and pursue policy, provided that the member does not engage in willful or unjustifiable transgressions. Other than insulation from control by the SEC (and indirectly from the President and Congress), what other purpose is served by the Act's provision for fixed terms and highly circumscribed removal?
The PCAOB's substantial discretion and autonomy is further evidenced by the limited statutory role assigned to the SEC with respect to Board inspections, investigations, and enforcement determinations. To be sure, Sarbanes-Oxley provides for SEC oversight in connection with the PCAOB's final rules and disciplinary sanctions, and authorizes the SEC to inspect and 94. To further enhance the PCAOB's powers as a regulator, the Act provides that the PCAOB may seek issuance by the SEC of a subpoena for documents or testimony, where third parties outside the auditing industry are unable or unwilling to cooperate voluntarily. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(2)(C).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(1)(A)-(B) (specifying that in connection with any disciplinary proceeding, the Board shall "bring specific charges with respect to the firm or associated person," provide notice of, and "an opportunity to defend against, such charges").
role for the SEC in all of the interim steps leading up to SEC review of the PCAOB's final disciplinary sanctions.
Sarbanes-Oxley accords the PCAOB a vast array of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers, and the Board's exercise of these powers often results in decisions that are not "subject to check by the Commission at every significant step." With respect to PCAOB 91 investigations, their scope and duration (including which accounting firms and officials are investigated, and for what) rests entirely with the Board. Moreover, the Act provides that as a condition of registration, accounting firms and associated persons must consent to cooperate with the PCAOB, including any requests for the production of documents or testimony. The 92 Act's requirement of mandatory cooperation by registered firms and officials, enforceable through Board-imposed sanctions, facilitates the PCAOB's 93 ability to uncover evidence of possible violations of professional standards, PCAOB rules, and the federal securities laws (including failures to supervise the conduct of others), and ensures that the PCAOB can obtain evidence without having to apply to the SEC for a subpoena.
94
Based on the investigatory record presented by the PCAOB staff (a record that may take a year or more to compile), the Board acting in its prosecutorial capacity then decides whether enforcement action against a firm or its officials is warranted. That is, the Board decides who does-or does not-have to 95 defend against specific charges, and the Board decides what those charges shall be. If the Board, acting in its prosecutorial capacity, determines that the investigatory record does not warrant enforcement action, the SEC has no statutory review role at all. The Board's adjudicative function commences once disciplinary charges are filed against a firm or associated person. In its adjudicative capacity, the Board decides whether the facts (agreed to in a settlement or placed in But unlike Sarbanes-Oxley's oversight provisions, which obligate the SEC to review the PCAOB's final rules and disciplinary actions, the SEC's enforcement authority over the PCAOB, including its authority to displace or limit Board functions, is merely an SEC power to sanction the PCAOB for transgressions. In fact, the very caption of that subsection of the Act terms this authority a "sanction." The majority's supposition that the SEC may limit 109 or remove "Board authority altogether" is therefore subject to an essential statutory prerequisite: The SEC must issue an order after an on-the-record finding that the PCAOB engaged in sanctionable misconduct. Moreover, while the SEC may promulgate a rule "reliev[ing]" the Board of any of its enforcement responsibilities, the APA requires the SEC to provide a reasoned explanation of its action after notice and the opportunity for public comment, and the rule itself would be subject to review by a federal 110 court.
111
There are also many provisions in the Act that would be superfluous if the PCAOB were, as the D.C. Circuit found, subject to the SEC's "extraordinary" direction and supervision. For example, the PCAOB is authorized to refer an investigation to the SEC, and is permitted to share with the SEC the 112 otherwise confidential documents and materials received by the Board in the course of its inspections and investigations. These provisions authorizing 113 referrals and permitting disclosure of investigative materials would have been unnecessary had Congress truly intended the members of the PCAOB to operate as "subordinates" of the SEC's Commissioners.
Likewise, if Congress had intended the members of the PCAOB to function as the subordinates of the SEC, it almost certainly would have assigned the SEC additional responsibilities to facilitate the SEC's purported direction and supervision of Board members and employees. Instead, Congress concentrated the SEC's oversight in three principal areas: rulemaking, disciplinary proceedings, and funding. With respect to this latter responsibility, the SEC must approve the PCAOB's annual budget, and 114 must approve the formula for calculating the "accounting support fee" that Congress authorized the PCAOB to impose on all public companies to fund Board operations.
115
The statutory design thus ensures that no PCAOB rule can become law, no PCAOB sanction can be imposed on a firm or accountant, and no PCAOBimposed tax can be levied on a public company, over the SEC's specific objection. As we shall see, insofar as the PCAOB is a private-sector corporation, government oversight in connection with its rulemaking, disciplinary proceedings, and taxing authority is essential. Sarbanes-Oxley's 116 provisions for SEC oversight of the PCAOB, with very few exceptions, reflect 117. The D.C. Circuit twice noted that the PCAOB's power to "sue and be sued, complain and defend" is subject to the SEC's approval. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 670, 681 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7211(f)(1) (2006)). Congress may have included this provision to effectively preclude the PCAOB, as a corporate entity in its own right, from instituting litigation against the SEC. The possibility of a regulator subject to SEC oversight initiating litigation against its "overseer" was not unprecedented. a constitutional rock-bottom minimum for a valid congressional delegation of governmental power to a "private" corporation.
117

Legislative History
The legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley reinforces the text's design of a board that is substantively independent, not only from the accounting industry that it regulates, but also from the SEC and elected officials to whom the SEC is answerable. The Senate Report explains that the Act "creates a strong, independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies" and emphasizes the Board's "plenary" rulemaking, and its "broad authority to investigate" possible violations of PCAOB rules, the Act, or the federal securities laws. The congressional record is also replete with 120 references to the PCAOB as a "strong, independent . . . board with significant authority," and with respect to PCAOB rulemaking, states specifically that Board as an entity with "massive power, unchecked power, by design."
123
Senator Phil Gramm's reference to the PCAOB's "massive power, unchecked power" merits more than a mere snippet. Less than three weeks before the passage of the Act, Senator Gramm shared with his colleagues the view that: Congress sought to create a PCAOB that was independent of the SEC to a significant degree. And the fact that the Senator initially sought to persuade his colleagues to support a board that was designed to be "a little more independent of the SEC" should only bolster the accuracy of his assessment of the Board for which he ultimately voted. The legislative record also facilitates our understanding of why Congress was particularly concerned about the PCAOB's ability to exercise independent judgment in connection with auditor oversight: As the D.C. Circuit recognized and acknowledged, "the level of Presidential control over the Board reflects Congress's intention to insulate the Board from partisan forces." In 127 particular, Congress sought to avert the "extraordinary amount of political pressure" previously directed at the SEC's Commissioners, when the SEC had attempted during the 2000 election year to promulgate stricter requirements for auditor independence. As Senator Paul Sarbanes recounted during a SEC hearing, several witnesses had advised Congress that "if we can structure the board well enough, it might actually have more independence from political influence than the SEC would have." And Senator Debbie Stabenow raised 129 her own concern "about finding a better way to insulate the establishment of accounting standards from politics and pressure, both from the industry, and frankly, from Congress." 136. See Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683 n.13 (concluding that the PCAOB is not "an unprecedented Congressional innovation" because the SEC's "wide-ranging oversight over the Board was modeled after the rules" regarding SEC authority over SROs).
137. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 1022-25 (observing that both the NYSE and the Investment Bankers Association of America (a trade group that later restructured to become the NASD) "were formed at the initiative of securities brokers and firms long before Congress enveloped them in a regulatory scheme" and emphasizing that neither the NYSE, nor FINRA, have a governmentally-appointed board).
the new unit would have more susceptible to indirect control by the President and Congress.
Although subject to SEC oversight and enforcement 134 authority, Board members with fixed five-year terms and strict restrictions on removal were far more likely to bring their independent judgment to bear on the critical issues that faced the auditing industry in the wake of the scandals. The PCAOB's independence from the SEC was not an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of depoliticizing the PCAOB. There is certainly an argument to be made that the PCAOB's design has furthered the congressional goal of insulating the Board from political influence and partisan forces. But as we shall see in Part III of this Article, 135 the Constitution ensures that all governmental power is subject to constitutional checks and balances, and some of these checks are derived from the political process itself. The PCAOB's design may have been rooted in pragmatism, but the PCAOB's double-decker independence fatally clashes with the democratic accountability demanded by the Constitution.
C. The SRO Model
Congress patterned the PCAOB on the securities industry's selfregulatory model, under which SROs, such as FINRA and the NYSE, exercise substantial regulatory powers subject to SEC oversight. But there is a 136 simple reason why that model has not triggered the Appointments Clause and separation of power challenges that are now being directed at the PCAOB: SROs, such as the NASD (now FINRA) and the NYSE, are not created by the government, and their officials are not appointed by the government. 144. Exchange Act § 19(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(2). To the extent that there are differences between the PCAOB and the NYSE and FINRA beyond the critical distinction of the PCAOB's governmental creation and appointment of members, these differences are principally designed to make the PCAOB an even more powerful regulator than the SROs. These differences include: the PCAOB's guaranteed source of funding through statutorily mandated accounting support fees paid by public companies, 15 U.S.C. The SRO model is nonetheless important to our understanding of the structural relationship between the PCAOB and the SEC. Because the statutory provisions granting the SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the PCAOB are virtually identical to the statutory provisions providing for SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the NYSE and FINRA, the SEC's 70-year history with SRO rulemaking, investigations, and enforcement tells us much about the SEC's ability to "direct and supervise" or otherwise control the PCAOB.
The similarities between the PCAOB and the NYSE and FINRA are striking. As with the PCAOB, Congress has delegated substantial rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers to these private self-regulators, with each SRO's recordkeeping, rulemaking, and disciplinary actions subject to SEC oversight. The SEC may also "by rule . . . abrogate, add to, and delete 140 from" the rules of an SRO. Moreover, as with the PCAOB, the SEC has 141 enforcement authority over the SROs. Specifically, the SEC may, by order, suspend or revoke the registration of an SRO, or "censure or impose limitations on the activities, functions, and operations" of an SRO, upon a finding that the SRO has either violated, or is unable to comply with the law or, "without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce" any member firm's or any associated person's compliance with any such provision or rule. The SEC may also remove any SRO officer or director for willful The SRO model thus provides for SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the private self-regulators in the securities industry. But the NYSE and the FINRA exercise substantial autonomy and discretion, notwithstanding the SEC's authority, and the SEC does not control these SROs at every significant step. As former SEC Chairman Justice William O. Douglas once explained, the SRO model in the securities industry lets "the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use, but with the hope it would never have to be used." Although Congress revised the statutory scheme in 1975 to provide 145 for additional SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the SROs (as reflected in the provisions discussed above), the fundamental framework recognized by Justice Douglas has remained unchanged.
146
Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a similar congressional intention to assign "leadership" over the accounting industry to the PCAOB, with the SEC playing the "residual role." The statutory design ensured that the PCAOB would take leadership in the area of rulemaking-with the PCAOB's authority described as "plenary." PCAOB leadership was also expected vis-à-vis key 147 executive functions involving inspections and investigations of, and enforcement actions against, auditors of public companies. The fact that the SEC can theoretically pick up a well-oiled "shotgun" sometime in the future does not make the SEC the superior of the PCAOB for the present while that shotgun remains behind the door.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has described the SEC's "supervisory authority" over the SROs as "extensive" and "pervasive." The Court, 148 however, made those observations in the context of the SEC's statutory responsibility to review and approve proposed SRO rules. Because no SRO 150. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing Exchange Act provisions with respect to SEC review of SRO rulemaking).
151. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt devotes an entire chapter of his book to the topic of securities analysts and the conflicts of interest they faced in connection with their "sell-side" research and recommendations. LEVITT, supra note 128, at 70-92. The chapter discusses in great detail the SEC's multiyear struggle to convince the SROs to "come up with a new code of conduct for analysts." Id. at 73.
152. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999 ) (holding that the SEC's "mere approval" of a rule on an NASD form is not sufficient to constitute state action, and emphasizing that the SEC would be responsible for the NASD rule "only where it exercised coercive power or provided significant encouragement").
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Exchange Act provisions with respect to SEC review of SRO disciplinary sanctions). rulemaking is clearly subject to the SEC's supervision. But rulemaking agendas are generally set by the SROs-not by the SEC. The SEC suggests new initiatives, provides input and feedback, and may threaten to step in with the agency's own rules in instances of SRO inaction. Yet when it comes to their own rulemaking, SROs seldom act under the SEC's direction. 151 Consequently, SRO rules are only rarely considered "state action" for purposes of constitutional protections or requirements in federal statutes.
152
The SEC also performs an extensive role as reviewer of SRO disciplinary sanctions and, thus, no SRO member or associated person may be subject to discipline over the SEC's objection. Yet the SEC's de novo review authority 153 over SRO sanctions does not alter the fact that SROs typically operate with substantial discretion and autonomy, free from SEC control, in all of the many steps leading up to those disciplinary sanctions. Although SROs are required under the Exchange Act "to provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members," SROs generally conduct their investigations, enforcement 154 determinations, and adjudications free from dictates by the SEC.
Indeed, for purposes of constitutional protections such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the SEC and courts have consistently refused to regard SRO action as "state action" precisely because SRO investigations and disciplinary proceedings are not conducted under the direction and supervision of the SEC. Only on those infrequent occasions 156. Lawhead, supra note 155, at 248-56 (discussing "government compulsion" and "joint action" tests for state action); Karmel, supra note 155, at 177- cooperation between the Commission and the NASD will rarely render NASD a state actor," but holding that respondent "proffered enough evidence concerning the Joint Investigation to earn an evidentiary hearing").
160. In re Larry Ira Klein, Release No. 34-37835, 63 SEC Docket 52, 58 (Oct. 17, 1996) (ruling that NASD disciplinary proceedings need not conform to 28 U.S.C. § 2462's five-year statute of limitations generally applicable in government proceedings where a sanction is sought).
in which the SRO engages in "joint action" with the SEC or the DOJ, or when the government uses coercive power or "significantly encourages" SRO action, can "state action" be claimed.
156
In a typical SRO investigation, however, such government coercion or joint action is not present. As one FINRA official has explained, FINRA's investigations are not pre-cleared by the SEC. The SEC has no statutory authority, and therefore no coercive power to order FINRA to litigate any specific case. The initiative for typical cases is entirely FINRA's. FINRA investigates, files a complaint, and litigates the case, all without any government approval or pressure to do so. Because the decisions are made by FINRA, FINRA is not a state actor under the government compulsion test. 157 Moreover, under "joint-action" analysis, facts demonstrating cooperation between an SRO and the SEC will rarely render an SRO a state actor, and 158 "the mere fact of such collaboration is generally insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate state action."
159
With respect to SRO disciplinary proceedings, both the SEC and federal courts have routinely depicted the SEC's role as a limited one. As the SEC has itself emphasized, SRO proceedings are not initiated by a government agency, nor does their initiation require our approval. We do not participate in the disciplinary proceeding before the SRO, and we do not control when the SRO begins or concludes its determination. Our sole responsibility in this context arises when an SRO imposes a final disciplinary sanction on a person who seeks review of the SRO's determination from this Commission.
161. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1181 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause nor collateral estoppel prevented the SEC from instituting its own enforcement action, because "as reviewer" of an NASD disciplinary proceeding, "the SEC does not become a party; its review role is an adjudicatory one"). Lower courts have likewise described the SEC's role in SRO disciplinary proceedings as involving "adjudication." 161 In resolving the constitutional questions presented in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court should consider the effect that its decision is likely to have on SROs such as FINRA and the NYSE. If the SRO model is one that provides for "a vast degree of Commission control at every significant step," then SROs are essentially alter egos of the SEC, and most of their 162 actions would constitute "state action" that is subject to the Constitution and possibly a host of federal statutes. If, however, the SRO model is one that provides for SEC oversight and enforcement authority, but nonetheless permits the SROs to operate with substantial discretion and autonomy, then under that model, the SROs, and by extension the PCAOB, cannot be said to be operating under the SEC's "extraordinary" direction and supervision. The Supreme Court can avoid effectively overturning decades of "state action" precedent by concluding that the D.C. Circuit has misconstrued the SRO model on which the PCAOB was patterned.
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The complaint in Free Enterprise Fund alleged that the PCAOB's structure suffered from three distinct constitutional infirmities: the Appointments Clause and separation of powers claims that are now before the Supreme Court, and a third claim of unconstitutional delegation. More specifically, this third claim alleged that Congress's "grant of wide-ranging authority to the Board" constituted an unconstitutional delegation of "legislative power to an entity outside of the Legislative Branch." The Petitioners' decision to abandon their nondelegation claim was undoubtedly a wise one. Yet the so-called "nondelegation doctrine" is essential to an understanding of why Congress structured the PCAOB in the way that it did, and therefore informs the Court's constitutional analysis under the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Congress routinely delegates to both public and private entities the power to make rules and set standards, and the modern constitutional constraints on such delegations are minimal. When applied to congressional grants of 167 power to public entities, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits only those delegations that fail to articulate an "intelligible principle" to which the public entity must conform. Accordingly, modern courts have consistently held 168 that Congress may vest federal agencies with vast rulemaking power, provided it is not "standardless." Viewing the PCAOB as a federal entity, and 169 170
quoting Sarbanes-Oxley's provision that PCAOB rules must be "'necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,'" the Yet even if the district court had viewed the PCAOB as a private entity for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, Congress's grant of power to the PCAOB undoubtedly would have survived constitutional scrutiny. Congressional delegations of rulemaking power to private entities raise substantial concerns about how that power will be utilized. As the Supreme Court observed in Carter Coal, "[t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business." But the 174 Supreme Court has made clear that governmental oversight of private decision-making will nonetheless insulate such congressional delegations from constitutional challenge. Accordingly, because no PCAOB rule, disciplinary 175 sanction, or "accounting support fee" can take effect over the SEC's objection, the Act's provision for SEC oversight would have shielded the PCAOB from "nondelegation" attack just as SEC oversight over rulemaking and discipline has insulated the NYSE and NASD from constitutional challenges on grounds of nondelegation. 176 This so-called "private" nondelegation doctrine provides the most compelling explanation for why Congress structured the PCAOB in the way that it did. Recall Senator Gramm's statement that "[w]e want it to be private, but we want it to have governmental powers. We have tried to structure it in ways to try to accommodate this." The SEC's oversight and enforcement authority over the PCAOB was a necessary "accommodation" because in the absence of such SEC authority, Congress's grant of rulemaking power to a "private" PCAOB would have been constitutionally doomed. Senator Gramm explicitly acknowledged this "accommodation" when he compared his and Senator Enzi's alternative board with the PCAOB: "[o]urs is a little more independent of the SEC; though in the end, to meet the constitutional test, the SEC had to have authority over it." The private nondelegation doctrine is 178 very likely the "constitutional test" to which Senator Gramm was referring. The private nondelegation doctrine also provides a far more satisfactory answer to a question posed by the D.C. Circuit majority. Emphasizing the Act's "sweeping" provisions for SEC oversight and enforcement, the majority asked rhetorically: "why has Congress granted such pervasive Commission authority over the Board if not to preserve the means of Executive control?"
179
But the majority's supposition that Congress sought to "preserve the means of Executive control" is undercut by Congress's mistaken impression that the PCAOB was not "an agency or establishment of the Federal Government." Congress was, however, acutely aware of the constitutional restraints on delegations to private regulators, and was understandably concerned that its delegation of vast rulemaking, adjudicative, and taxing authority to the PCAOB not run afoul of the Constitution. Thus, the control that Congress sought to preserve was largely legislative; neither Sarbanes-Oxley's text nor its legislative history evidence congressional concern with respect to executive control. PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS As I stated at the outset of this Article, the Free Enterprise Fund case envelops constitutional law in securities law. By examining the text of Sarbanes-Oxley and the events leading up to its passage, a clear "securities law" story emerges. Simply put, in creating the PCAOB as the accounting industry's overseer, Congress wanted it all: It wanted a strong, independent, private sector regulator with governmental powers, free from partisan forces and political influence. Yet Congress was unwilling to allow the accounting industry, working with the SEC, to establish its own regulator; nor was Congress willing to allow the private sector to select the new regulator's leadership. The Maloney Act model-culminating with the establishment of the NASD in 1938-allowed "too many issues to remain open to debate even after Congress has acted." So Congress established a strong, independent 183 board appointed by the SEC, and subjected that board to oversight in certain well-delineated areas.
Constitutional law-the Constitution and the body of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution-tells us that Congress cannot have it all. As "the government itself," the PCAOB is subject to constitutional checks and balances, including the commands of the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. These checks and balances help to "ensure that those who wield[ ]" government power are "accountable to political force and the will of the people." These checks and balances also "allow[ ]the 184 citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance." 185 The PCAOB's structure and design accords the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability. Indeed, no elected official is directly responsible for appointing or removing the PCAOB members who promulgate rules, perform inspections, investigate suspected violations, prosecute firms and accountants, impose disciplinary sanctions, and levy taxes on public companies. Instead, the President appoints, and the Senate confirms, the SEC Commissioners who are charged with overseeing the PCAOB, with SEC Commissioners themselves insulated from presidential and congressional control to a significant degree.
(observing that independent regulatory agencies possess "comparative freedom from ballot-box control" because they "enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from 'the exercise of political oversight'" (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 916 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
187. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1065. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
188. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1065. See also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509 (2001) (stating that "the clarity of responsibility for an action or policy involves the degree to which the body politic can discern who in the political system is responsible for a decision, policy, or activity, so that efforts to exert political influence can be directed to the proper authorities").
189. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1062.
The pursuit of policy through PCAOB-like entities is worrisome because it places elected officials in a position where they will benefit regardless of the actual outcomes of those policies. That is, as I argued in my first article on the PCAOB, through the use of such doubly insulated regulators, "Congress and the President can claim credit for the ingenuity that resulted in regulatory successes and they can avoid blame for the . . . regulator's unpopular decisions or unwise policies." But the general public ultimately loses under this 187 scenario because blurred lines of accountability compromise the effective functioning of a representative democracy, and the more confusion that is created, "the lesser the likelihood that voters can express accurate preferences for retaining or removing elected officials." The pursuit of policy through 188 congressionally created "private" regulators like the PCAOB is all the more troubling because such "private" regulators may exercise vast regulatory power unfettered by the FOIA, APA, and other administrative statutes designed to curb administrative discretion and otherwise ensure that policymaking is rational, transparent, and accountable. 189 This Article, of course, is incomplete absent a fuller discussion as to how the constitutional analysis is affected by a negative answer to the question posed by its title. If the PCAOB is not "a heavily controlled component" of the SEC, and if the Board's exercise of its statutory duties is not "subject to check by the Commission at every significant step," then its structure cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's Appointments Clause and separation of powers precedents. Section A explains why the PCAOB's five members are "principal" officers who, under the Appointments Clause, must be appointed by the President with advice and consent by the Senate. Section B explains why Congress's decision to vest the PCAOB appointment and removal power in the SEC violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
JAG, Sarbanes-Oxley ensured that the SEC does not possess "the powerful tool" of at-will removal. 212 Likewise, the independent counsel's investigative and prosecutorial authority at issue in Morrison v. Olson constitutes a subset of the powers 213 assigned to the PCAOB in Sarbanes-Oxley. The independent counsel did not have the power to enact rules with the force of law for an entire profession, nor did she have the ability to adjudicate her own prosecutions. In evaluating her exclusively executive authority, and in reaching the conclusion that the independent counsel was an "inferior officer" who could properly be appointed by a "court of law," the Supreme Court relied on four factors: that she was subject to for-cause removal by "a higher Executive Branch official" (the Attorney General, who serves at the pleasure of the President); that she 214 was empowered "to perform only certain, limited duties"; that her 215 jurisdiction was narrow; and that her "office [was] limited in tenure." 216 217 PCAOB members, in contrast, are removable only for-cause (defined restrictively) by SEC Commissioners who themselves are insulated from direct Presidential control. Moreover, PCAOB members have broad statutory duties that may be expanded even further by the SEC or the Board itself; 218 they have jurisdiction over every registered public accounting firm and their associated persons; and they have tenure that extends for five years and not in any way tied to a particular person, investigation, or issue. Finally, unlike either Edmond or Morrison, Free Enterprise Fund is not a case where the Supreme Court can simply defer to Congress's judgment that newly created federal officers are "inferior officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Rather, as emphasized previously, Sarbanes-Oxley states explicitly that no member of the PCAOB shall be deemed an "officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such service." Congress was likely operating under the misimpression that 219 PCAOB board members would be private sector officials akin to the officials who head the NYSE and the NASD (now FINRA). Thus, the task now falls directly on the Supreme Court to situate the PCAOB within the federal government. Both Sarbanes-Oxley's text and its legislative history command a finding that PCAOB members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with advice and consent from the Senate.
B. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard that enforces the Framers' decision to "dispers[e] the federal power among the three branches-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial . . . ." The doctrine ensures that one branch of government does not 220 encroach on the duties and responsibilities of another branch, and that power is not aggrandized by one branch at the expense of another. As the Supreme 221 Court has recognized, "[t]he ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed." Accordingly, even if 222 Congress and the President are comfortable with the manner in which the responsibility or power was redistributed, actions that violate the separation of powers doctrine must be declared unconstitutional.
223
In structuring the PCAOB as an entity that is doubly insulated from partisan forces and political pressure, Congress impermissibly interfered with the President's Article II executive powers. Congress's unconstitutional interference is most evident in the Act's provision for five-year fixed terms with explicit limitations on the removal of PCAOB members. The Supreme Court made clear in Humphrey's Executor v. United States that Congress 224 may create regulatory entities that exercise significant executive power, notwithstanding the fact that the officials who head those entities are insulated from direct presidential control by their fixed terms and limited removal. 226. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 625-26. 227. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (stating that "because the independent counsel may be terminated for 'good cause,' the Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is completely performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions of the Act").
228. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628 (stating that independent agencies "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive").
229. Like the Act's provision for SEC removal of PCAOB officials, Congress's decision to lodge the appointment power in the SEC further attenuates the President's control over the PCAOB, and thus further compromises the separation of powers. The SEC's power to appoint PCAOB officials deprives the President of the ability to choose like-minded members who share his policy goals and preferences. As the current Solicitor General recognized in a 2001 article, "[a]s a practical matter, successful insulation of administration from the President-even if accomplished in the name of 'independence'-will tend to enhance Congress's own authority over the insulated activities." Thus, while the Act's provisions for the appointment 231 and removal of PCAOB members do not constitute direct congressional aggrandizement of power, these provisions nonetheless produce that effect.
Under Humphrey's Executor and Morrison, the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from enhancing its power through the creation of independent regulatory agencies like the SEC. However, the Supreme Court should not extend those decisions to allow Congress to accumulate even more power through the creation of a regulator such as the PCAOB that is further detached from Presidential appointment and removal. Constitutional clashes over the doctrine of separation of powers are often couched as debates between formalists (emphasizing a "unitary executive" model of the Presidency) and functionalists (emphasizing the ultimate balance of power, rather than its strict separation). Yet with respect to the PCAOB, even 232 functionalists have good reason to conclude that the structural design of the PCAOB is a bridge too far.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress did not intend to do so, when it created the PCAOB as an accounting industry regulator with an SEC-appointed board, Congress created a federal entity that is "part of the Government" for purposes of the 233 Constitution, including the commands of the Appointments Clause and principles of separation of powers. The PCAOB's doubly insulated design is constitutionally flawed because it allows the PCAOB to escape such checks and balances.
If the Supreme Court declares the PCAOB unconstitutional, Congress should act quickly to redesign the PCAOB, either as a true component of the SEC, or as an independent regulatory agency with members who are appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate, and removable for cause by the President. Either alternative will result in an entity that is substantially less "strange." But that new PCAOB will be one that is far more in keeping with the democratic values embodied in the text and structure of the Constitution.
